Fiscalité, édification de l’état et redevabilité:
une synthèse by Prichard, Wilson
The past decade, in particular, has 
witnessed surging interest in the possibility 
that improved taxation in lower-income 
countries may not only be critical for raising 
revenue to fund public services, but may 
also be critical to spurring processes 
of statebuilding and strengthened 
accountability. This possibility draws on 
a simple and compelling logic: a state 
wishing to raise greater taxes will need 
to invest in the construction of stronger 
state institutions, across a range of areas, 
while it will be forced to bargain with 
citizens, exchanging improved services and 
governance for expanded tax payments. 
Put differently, taxation is increasingly 
understood to lie near the centre of both 
state function and state-society relations.
However, while arguments linking taxation 
to improved governance are highly attractive 
in theory, their application in practice is 
likely to be significantly more complex – but 
research has only recently begun to delve in 
detail into this empirical complexity. This has 
two, related, implications. 
First, research has until recently paid 
insufficient attention to understanding the 
contingency of tax-governance links: that 
is, the contexts in which such positive links 
are, but as importantly are not, likely to 
emerge. It is increasingly clear that these 
links are not automatic or guaranteed, but 
depend on key features of national and 
local tax systems, and the broad social, 
political and economic environments in 
which they exist. 
Second, and as a result, research has 
tended to say little about concrete policy 
implications. A natural extension of the 
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belief that taxation can be a spur to improved 
governance has been a belief that expanded 
taxation should thus be an important policy 
priority. On balance this is likely good advice. 
But taxation is not, in and of itself, a positive 
outcome; it only becomes a positive outcome 
when taxation is translated into stronger and 
more accountable states, and improved service 
delivery. There is thus an urgent need to 
consider the policy steps that can be taken to 
strengthen the positive connections between 
taxation, statebuilding and accountability. 
ICTD-linked research has played a critical role in 
advancing these key areas of inquiry.
Linking taxation, 
statebuilding and 
accountability
Arguments linking taxation to broader 
improvements in governance are increasingly 
widely known, while recent research has begun 
to map out what these connections look like in 
practice in contemporary developing countries.
The argument that taxation may be a spur to 
state building begins from a simple premise: 
collecting taxes effectively is complex, and requires 
cooperation across state agencies, and can thus be 
the leading edge of the broader development of state 
institutions. These connections between taxation and 
state building are likely to take three broad forms:
• Demonstration effects: investments in modernising 
tax agencies can set new standards for other parts 
of the public service with respect to, among others, 
meritocratic recruitment, opportunities for career 
advancement and performance measurement.1
• Spillover effects: a state wishing to tax more 
will be forced to invest in building a strong 
tax agency, but also in strengthening parallel 
agencies including, Ministries of Finance, 
business registration, land registration, 
property valuation, the police and the judiciary.2
• Information sharing effects: data gathered by tax 
agencies can be a critical input for supporting 
improved economic policy making, targeting of 
services, and law enforcement, among others.3
The argument that taxation can be a spur to the 
expansion of governmental responsiveness and 
accountability rests on two closely related logics. 
First, citizens who are required to pay taxes are 
more likely to feel ownership of government 
activities, and to make proactive demands for 
reciprocity and representation. 
Second, a government in need of tax revenue 
from its citizens will have stronger incentives to 
make reciprocal concessions to taxpayers, in 
order to encourage tax compliance. 
More simply, the need for governments to raise 
taxes from their citizens is expected to spur ‘tax 
bargaining’. This may take the form of relatively 
explicit government concessions in exchange 
for tax compliance, but may also occur through 
more prolonged periods of conflict over taxation 
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1 Brautigam 2008, Prichard and Leonard 2010, Prichard 2010.
2  Brautigam 2008, Prichard and Leonard 2010, Prichard 2010.
3 Chaudhry 1997.
that nonetheless serve to generate longer-term 
pressure for expanded responsiveness and 
accountability. In recent years ICTD researchers 
have been at the forefront of beginning to understand 
the details of these processes linking taxation, 
responsiveness and accountability in practice.4
Evidence of taxation, 
statebuilding and 
accountability
While arguments linking taxation to improved 
governance have been widely made, it is only 
recently that detailed empirical evidence has 
begun to emerge –though with a focus primarily 
on the impact of taxation on responsiveness and 
accountability.
The most powerful research comes from ICTD 
Research Director Wilson Prichard, whose book 
Taxation, Responsiveness and Accountability 
in Sub-Saharan Africa offers the most detailed 
existing empirical investigation of these links.5 
It provides detailed cross-country econometric 
evidence of the existence of links between 
dependence on tax revenue and extent of 
accountability, and then presents detailed case 
studies of the evolution of tax systems in Ghana, 
Kenya and Ethiopias cases in which taxpayers 
have responded to taxation with successful 
demands for reciprocity, and of cases in which 
governments have made significant concessions 
in efforts to encourage tax compliance. 
As importantly, the book is the first to capture in 
detail the more indirect ways in which the need for 
governments to rely on taxation of their own citizens 
has generated long-term pressure for accountability. 
In some cases government efforts to tax have 
spurred the long-term mobilisation and organisation 
of civil society actors, including business 
associations, with lasting governance implications. 
In other cases citizens have aggressively resisted 
taxation by particularly unpopular governments, 
thus accelerating pressure for reform, and the 
likelihood of changes in government.6 
These conclusions are supported by two 
recent studies that have provided experimental 
evidence of the same processes in low-income 
countries. Laura Paler – another ICTD 
researcher – has published experimental 
work from Indonesia indicating that citizens 
who are required to pay taxes to finance local 
government activities are more likely to demand 
accountability.7 More recently, Lucy Martin has 
provided similar experimental evidence of the 
mobilising potential of taxation in Uganda.8 
In turn, mounting evidence – primarily from 
the ICTD – of the close connections between 
government performance and tax compliance 
offers further support for the broad prediction that 
governments needing to tax will be more likely 
to make governing concessions to taxpayers.9 
Finally, Joshi et al., again from the ICTD, review 
arguments about the potential for taxation of 
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small informal businesses to act as a catalyst 
for more active engagement, and greater 
accountability.10
Bottom line: there is mounting evidence that 
taxation can, indeed, be a spur to expanded 
responsiveness and accountability, driven by its 
capacity to mobilise citizen demands and the 
threat of tax resistance by taxpayers. However, 
the links between tax and accountability are not 
likely to always take the form of relatively explicit 
negotiation, but may frequently take longer-term 
and more indirect forms.
Applying these lessons at 
the local government level
While the most prominent work on taxation and 
governance has thus focused on bargaining 
over taxation at the national government level, 
research – again primarily by the ICTD – has 
increasingly sought to explore these same 
relationships at the local government level. The 
motivation for exploring these issues at the 
local government level is straightforward: local 
government tax systems are characterised by 
a wide range of comparatively direct taxes and 
levies, applied to a broad base of the population, 
thus creating a context in which relatively direct 
links between tax and public spending are 
possible. And, indeed, one of the central promises 
of decentralisation is that it may generate 
stronger ties between citizens and states – with 
bargaining over taxation playing a central role.
Consistent with this possibility, ICTD researchers 
have begun to provide new evidence of the 
potential links between tax and accountability at 
the local level. The most compelling evidence 
comes from Jibao and Prichard, who document 
experience of reforming the property tax system 
in Sierra Leone.11 They provide evidence that in 
Bo City Council the desire to expand tax revenue 
drove the government to link new tax collection 
to specific and popular public services, which, in 
turn, reinforced government popularity and the 
sustainability of tax reform. That is, a virtuous 
circle of taxation and accountability emerged. 
Looking more broadly, ongoing research in 
Sierra Leone provides clear evidence that, even 
in smaller towns and villages, popular willingness 
to pay taxes has been shaped by broader 
trust in government – while the extension of 
local taxation has the potential to act as a spur 
to clarifying and strengthening coordination 
between different local levels of government. 
This remains a fruitful area of research, with 
ICTD research along these lines continuing in 
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While the most 
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Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, while close ICTD partners are launching 
similar work in Uganda and Tanzania.
Contingency, policy and 
a governance-focused tax 
reform agenda
While there is mounting evidence of the potential 
for taxation to spur improvements in governance, 
recent research has a second, equally important, 
message: while such positive connections are 
possible, they are far from guaranteed. Taxation is 
a fundamentally coercive act, and is only likely to 
be a social benefit if paired with specific strategies 
to ensure that money is used effectively, and that 
taxation can contribute to broader statebuilding. 
There is thus a clear need to focus more actively 
on how to encourage positive links between tax 
and governance – while minimising the prevalence 
of more strictly coercive forms of collection.
The most ambitious effort to address this 
question again comes from Prichard, who seeks 
to understand the conditions that have been 
most conducive to the development of strong 
links between tax and accountability – and, in 
turn, to offer relevant policy advice.12 He focuses 
on four broad areas for policy action:
1. Enhance the political salience of taxation 
– including via direct taxes. Taxpayers will 
be able to demand reciprocity in exchange 
for taxes and to resist taxes by unpopular 
governments more effectively when they are 
clearly aware of the taxes that they pay. This, 
however, is often not the case for the majority 
of taxpayers, who pay primarily indirect taxes 
that are hidden in the prices of goods. There 
are two major ways to increase the political 
salience of taxation. First, strengthen direct 
taxes, including income taxes, property taxes, 
and presumptive taxes on smaller businesses. 
Second, work with civil society, the media and 
other groups to actively raise awareness of 
existing taxes, and support public engagement.
2. Focus on horizontal equity in tax 
enforcement. Where enforcement is very 
uneven– with some taxpayers paying and 
others not – the dominant incentive for many 
taxpayers will be to seek to avoid taxes, 
rather than collectively demanding reciprocity 
from governments. By contrast, where 
governments focus on ensuring consistent tax 
enforcement among all taxpayers, this shifts 
incentives for taxpayers away from seeking 
narrow benefits or avoidance, and in favour 
of working collectively to ensure fairness, 
responsiveness and accountability. Thus, 
measures like selective tax exemptions, or 
international methods for wealthy taxpayers 
to avoid taxes, may not only be economically 
damaging, but may also have significant 
political consequences.
3. Expand transparency around taxation 
and budgeting – including, possibly, 
earmarking. Taxpayers will be better able, 
and more likely, to demand reciprocity from 
governments when they have access to 
information about how, and how much, 
revenue governments collect, and how that 
money is used. We have significant evidence, 
for example, that taxpayers have been 
more willing to pay taxes when they have 
had clear information about the use of that 
money for popular public services. A particular 
possibility surrounds the potential usefulness 
of earmarking tax revenue for key public 
initiatives: while tax earmarking is widely 
opposed by public finance experts because 
it reduces budget flexibility, in contexts of low 
trust between governments and taxpayers it 
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may be a useful short-term route to improved 
trust and accountability – and for increasing 
overall popular engagement with tax and 
budgeting issues.
4. Directly support popular engagement, 
including the creation of inclusive 
institutional spaces for tax bargaining. 
Finally, governments and donors can work 
directly to strengthen the scope for bargaining 
in two broad ways. First, direct support 
for the types of groups that can support 
broad popular engagement with tax issues, 
including the media, civil society and business 
associations. Second, the creation of specific 
institutional spaces in which such bargaining 
can happen. In both cases it is essential that 
these efforts be relatively inclusive, in the 
sense of involving a wide range of taxpayers, 
and not only larger taxpayers, as there is a 
significant risk of processes of tax bargaining 
being dominated by these larger taxpayers.
Moore has drawn specific attention to this last 
risk: that bargaining over taxation between 
taxpayers and governments may be dominated 
by elites, who are the largest taxpayers, to the 
exclusion of broader-based accountability.13 He 
has argued that while the creation of autonomous 
revenue authorities (RAs) in Africa has had some 
positive implications for the quality of revenue 
collection, one risk has been the development 
of a very close relationship between RAs 
and the business community – with potential 
consequences for the inclusivity of tax bargaining. 
In particular, larger taxpayers have continued to 
seek – and receive – significant tax incentives 
and exemptions, which have undermined 
tax systems and the broader potential for 
accountability enhancing tax bargaining. 
This reflects a broader concern in the literature 
that, because a large share of taxes in Africa 
are paid by a relatively small number of large 
businesses and (sometimes) wealthy individuals, 
tax bargaining may serve their interests, 
but exclude broader constituencies of small 
taxpayers. Consistent with this concern, Prichard 
and van den Boogaard draw attention to the 
major barriers to small businesses and market 
traders organising in response to taxation, 
owing to problems of collective action and the 
frequent weakness of informal sector business 
associations.14 These studies thus support the 
conclusions in Prichard (2015): if tax bargaining 
is to be a route to broad-based responsiveness 
and accountability, policy attention needs to be 
turned to how to ensure that such bargaining 
includes a broader group of taxpayers.15
While less has been written about the 
connections between tax and the expansion of 
state capacity, the same overarching message 
almost certainly holds: it cannot be assumed that 
taxation will drive broader gains in state capacity 
unless policymakers explicitly seek to foster 
these connections. Based on relatively limited 
existing evidence, Prichard suggests several 
principles that may usefully guide these efforts: 
(1) build strong links between tax agencies 
and related branches in government; (2) focus 
emphasis on effective data gathering, and on 
sharing data across government; (3) emphasise 
bureaucratic reforms that could be replicated 
elsewhere in government – like meritocratic 
hiring, or performance evaluation – rather than 
making RAs islands within government; and (4) 
focus on strengthening links between central 
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and local administrations, to extend potential 
benefits.16 In turn, the emphasis on building 
strong links between tax agencies and other 
branches of government is also emphasised in 
an ICTD review by McCluskey of strategies for 
improving tax-related capacity-building support.17
Finally, recent ICTD work has placed 
particular emphasis on the potential for strong 
tax-governance linkages at the local government 
level, but has in parallel stressed that there 
may also be particularly severe barriers to such 
connections emerging at the local government 
level. It is, more simply, an area that is ‘high risk, 
high reward’ for fostering tax bargaining. This 
is particularly important in post-conflict areas, 
where strengthening local taxation has been 
viewed as a potential strategy for rebuilding 
accountability from the ground up. However, in 
these contexts it seems clear that much more 
attention needs to be paid to the conditions 
necessary to facilitate the emergence of positive 
links between taxation, statebuilding and 
accountability. Four issues stand out, and are the 
subject of ongoing ICTD research: 
1. Local governments often have very little 
capacity, and weak incentives to collect 
revenue. Not only do local government often 
lack technical capacity, but because they rely 
very heavily on financial transfers from central 
government they generally have limited 
incentives to collect revenue locally. Indeed, 
some observers have suggested that central 
governments have sometimes designed local 
fiscal systems precisely to limit local fiscal 
autonomy and engagement between citizens 
and governments. In these circumstances 
efforts to increase local tax collection are more 
likely to be relatively ad hoc, and reversed in 
the face of political opposition, thus reducing 
the potential for sustained links between 
taxation, statebuilding and accountability.
2. Local government taxation can be 
predatory, amidst low-income populations, 
weak controls and elite domination. Where 
taxation systematically targets those who 
are most vulnerable, and application of tax 
rules – particularly to elites – is inconsistent, 
this undermines the potential for productive 
bargaining over taxation.
3. There are significant barriers to collective 
action in response to taxation at the 
local government level. The weakness, 
fragmentation and politicisation of potential 
taxpayer representatives – including local 
business associations or market associations 
– as well as the lack of institutional spaces for 
taxpayers to engage with governments, may 
make it difficult for taxpayers to make collective 
demands for reciprocity from governments.18
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4. Extensive systems of informal taxation 
at the local government level may 
complicate the potential for bargaining 
and statebuilding. Most existing research 
and policy advice has focused on formal tax 
systems, but recent research – primarily by 
the ICTD – has revealed that informal taxes, 
including to non-state actors, are pervasive. 
This implies a need to rethink strategies for 
fostering positive links between taxation, 
statebuilding and accountability.19
In light of these challenges, there is a need for 
continuing research into how to support the 
creation of positive tax-governance linkages at 
the local government level. This is a major focus 
of ongoing and proposed future ICTD work.
Looking forward
On balance, existing research has been very 
successful in establishing the potential for taxation 
to be a spur to statebuilding and the expansion 
of accountability. The next phase in this research 
agenda is to focus on concrete strategies for 
translating these potential benefits into practice. 
ICTD research over the past five years has led 
this effort, both in highlighting concrete policy 
options for strengthening tax-governance 
links, and in identifying directions for further 
investigating these relationships at the local level 
and in post-conflict environments.
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